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Psychological science can help to reduce eyewitness and 
criminal justice errors by distinguishing between accuracy 
and response biases.
Key Points
•• Eyewitnesses sometimes make identification errors 
that can have profound consequences. False identifi-
cations of the innocent can lead to false convictions, 
and false non-identifications of the guilty can allow 
criminals to commit additional crimes.
•• Research has led to several proposals for reforms, but 
many of the proposed reforms result in a trade-off of 
errors as correct and false identification rates covary.
•• A theoretical framework that separates accuracy from 
response bias is critical to understanding the error 
trade-off and producing true overall reductions in 
error.
•• Eyewitness confidence can be helpful in reducing 
errors as eyewitness evidence flows downstream in 
the criminal justice process.
Introduction
Eyewitnesses make mistakes. They sometimes fail to iden-
tify the guilty, and they sometimes falsely identify the inno-
cent. Social scientists have studied the problem of eyewitness 
error for more than 100 years (Arnold, 1906; Munsterberg, 
1908). In recent years, this research effort has coalesced into 
a number of concrete recommendations for reform of the 
criminal justice system, from the procedures that police offi-
cers use to obtain identification evidence to the laws that 
regulate how identification evidence is considered and eval-
uated within the legal system. These reforms have arisen 
from social scientists (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006; Wells 
et al., 1998), legal scholars (Wall, 1965), and scientific and 
legal organizations, including the American Bar Association 
(2004), the Innocence Project, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(1999), and most recently the National Academy of Sciences 
(National Research Council, 2014).
This article addresses a fundamental question about how 
these reforms—and future reforms—should be evaluated. 
Criminal justice policy is shaped by the careful consideration 
of social science, due process, procedural justice, and social 
values. Importantly, reasonable people can draw different 
conclusions and disagree about social values. However, there 
are two values about which there is little disagreement: (a) 
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the justice system must strive for accuracy and the reduction 
of error and (b) some errors are worse than others.
The fundamental importance of accuracy was succinctly 
noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tehan v. U.S. (1966), in 
stating that “the basic purpose of a trial is the determination 
of the truth.” As Laudan (2006) has persuasively argued, the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system requires that the 
government gets it right—by minimizing error, which means 
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent. There is 
also little disagreement that a false conviction of the innocent 
is a more costly and more troubling error than a false acquit-
tal of the guilty. Although some aspects of this cost asym-
metry are difficult to specify, one point is clear: A false 
conviction implies two errors—the false conviction itself, of 
course, and also a hidden and unadjudicated false acquittal. 
The conviction of an innocent person often allows the actual 
perpetrator to remain free.
Consistent with this cost asymmetry, eyewitness identifi-
cation research and reform has focused almost exclusively on 
one kind of error—the false identification of the innocent—
while giving much less consideration to the other error—the 
false non-identification of the guilty. This asymmetric focus 
has led to confusion about the goals of eyewitness identifica-
tion reform and, we argue, has misled researchers and policy 
makers to recommend and adopt new procedures that are no 
more accurate, or even less accurate, than the procedures they 
replaced. As we will show, police and legal procedures can 
and should be evaluated with respect to accuracy indepen-
dently of how one chooses to weigh the relative costs of cor-
rect and false identification errors. These relative costs are 
determined in part by how eyewitness identification evidence 
carries forward in the criminal justice process. On this point, 
it is important to note that eyewitness identification outcomes 
are not legal outcomes, rather they provide evidence that con-
tributes to legal outcomes. Therefore, this article will con-
sider not only the accuracy of eyewitness identification 
evidence but also the accuracy of adjudicative outcomes that 
rely on eyewitness evidence.
This article is organized as follows: First, we describe eye-
witness identification procedures as they are conducted in 
criminal cases and simulated in mock-crime experiments. 
Second, we outline a theoretical framework that describes the 
memory and decision processes that witnesses utilize in mak-
ing eyewitness identification decisions. Third, we examine 
the accuracy of recommended and non-recommended eyewit-
ness identification procedures. Fourth, we consider the accu-
racy of legal outcomes based on eyewitness evidence. We end 
with recommendations about how to go forward.
Eyewitness Identification and 
Experimental Simulation
We focus on two kinds of procedures used by the police 
to obtain identification evidence: showups and lineups. A 
showup is typically conducted when the police have identified 
a suspect shortly after the crime. For example, the police may 
observe a person who matches the victim’s description of the 
perpetrator of an armed robbery in close proximity to the 
crime, only minutes after the crime occurred. This single sus-
pect is typically shown to the witness who is asked to make a 
judgment as to whether the suspect is or is not the perpetrator 
of the crime. A typical lineup also presents the witness with a 
single suspect, plus some number of fillers, that is, people who 
are known to be innocent. A lineup is similar to a multiple-
choice exam question, except that the correct answer is only 
suspected to be correct but is not known to be correct. Thus, a 
positive identification of the suspect may be a correct identifi-
cation of a person who is guilty but might instead be a false 
identification of a person who is innocent. Because of this 
ground-truth uncertainty in real criminal cases, researchers 
have relied primarily on experimental simulations of crimes 
and criminal investigations. In these simulations, the crime is 
staged and presented live or on video. The “perpetrator” of the 
crime is an actor and confederate of the experimenter, and thus 
the accuracy of any suspect identification is known. In experi-
mental simulations, as in real cases, the witness may identify 
the suspect, identify a filler, or make no identification. Our 
focus here is on suspect identifications because these are the 
responses that carry forward in actual criminal cases as direct 
evidence of the suspect’s guilt.
Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework borrows heavily from signal 
detection theory, which was developed in the 1940s and 
1950s and applied to research in psychophysics (Green & 
Swets, 1966) and recognition memory (Egan, 1958; Wixted, 
2007), as well as many other decision tasks across a wide 
array of disciplines, including diagnostic medicine (Lusted, 
1971), violence risk analysis (Mossman, 1994; Rice & 
Harris, 1995), crime investigation (Bennell, Jones, & 
Melnyk, 2009), and law (Bell, 1987; DeKay, 1996; Laudan, 
2006; Lillquist, 2002).
One of the useful properties of signal detection theory is 
that it clearly separates the diagnostic accuracy of decision 
making from the consideration of the relative costs of differ-
ent decision errors. We will illustrate this distinction for the 
identification decisions of eyewitnesses and also more 
broadly for the decisions made by the criminal justice 
system.
Eyewitness Identification
The application of signal detection theory to eyewitness 
identification (see Clark, 2003; Wixted & Mickes, 2014) is a 
straightforward extension of its application to human mem-
ory (Clark & Gronlund, 1996; Egan, 1958; Wixted, 2007). It 
is particularly straightforward for showups. The witness 
compares the suspect to his or her memory of the perpetrator 
to decide whether to identify that suspect as the perpetrator. 
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It is important to note that both guilty and innocent suspects 
will vary in terms of how well they match the witness’s mem-
ory of the perpetrator. This variation is illustrated in Figure 1a.1 
Some guilty suspects will match memory quite well, but others 
will match less well, due in part to failures to store or retrieve 
the relevant information. On the whole, we should expect that 
innocent suspects will match the witness’s memory less well 
than guilty suspects do, but some innocent suspects will be 
relatively good matches. The theory proposes that witnesses 
apply a simple rule to make an identification decision: If the 
match between the suspect and the witness’s memory of the 
perpetrator is relatively high—above some criterion c—the 
witness will identify that suspect as the perpetrator, and if the 
match is below that criterion the witness will not identify that 
suspect as the perpetrator. False identification errors will 
occur for innocent suspects whose match is above that deci-
sion criterion, and false non-identification errors will occur 
for guilty suspects whose match is below that decision 
criterion.
Diagnostic accuracy—the ability to discriminate between 
suspects who are guilty versus suspects who are innocent—
is determined solely by the overlap of the guilty-suspect and 
innocent-suspect distributions. The only way to increase 
accuracy is to develop procedures that decrease the overlap. 
The relative cost of the two kinds of errors, false identifica-
tions and false non-identifications, is addressed by the place-
ment of the decision criterion c (Peterson, Birdsall, & Fox, 
1954). It is important to emphasize that shifting the decision 
criterion has no effect on diagnostic accuracy but only intro-
duces a trade-off between the kinds of errors that are made. 
Raising the decision criterion will not only reduce the false 
identification rate but will also reduce the correct identifica-
tion rate (thus, increasing the false non-identification rate). 
Lowering the decision criterion will introduce a similar 
trade-off by increasing the correct identification rate while 
also increasing the false identification rate. Peterson et al. 
(1954) had shown that the optimal placement of the decision 
criterion is determined by evaluating the relative costs asso-
ciated with this trade-off.
These same principles hold for a lineup. Each lineup 
member is compared with memory, and an identification is 
made of the person who is the best match to memory if that 
best match is above a criterion. Diagnostic accuracy, the abil-
ity to discriminate between guilty and innocent suspects, still 
depends on the overlap of the distributions; shifting the deci-
sion criterion only affects the trade-off between false identi-
fications avoided and correct identifications lost.
As it is described so far, the theory provides a framework 
for understanding the outcomes of eyewitness identification 
procedures. Again, it is important to note that eyewitness 
identification outcomes do not represent or specify legal out-
comes. Rather, they provide evidence that carries forward in 
the criminal justice process and contributes to legal out-
comes. Eyewitness evidence can provide law enforcement 
with grounds for arrest, or with a basis for seeking search 
warrants. Eyewitness evidence contributes to the plea nego-
tiations between prosecution and defense, and the jury ver-
dicts for cases that go to trial. Thus, it is important to not only 
consider eyewitness identification outcomes but also con-
sider how those outcomes flow downstream to contribute to 
the accuracy of the criminal justice outcomes which we dis-
cuss next.
Criminal Justice Outcomes
Legal scholars have also adapted signal detection theory as a 
framework for understanding criminal justice outcomes (Bell, 











Figure 1. (a) Distributions of match to memory for eyewitness 
identification of guilty and innocent suspects and (b) distribution 
of apparent guilt for adjudication of innocent and guilty 
defendants.
Note. The decision criterion for identification and guilty verdicts is 
represented by the vertical line labeled c. Note that the overlap of the 
distributions is less in (b) than (a) reflecting greater diagnosticity accuracy 
for adjudicative outcomes than for eyewitness identification outcomes.
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and innocent defendants will vary in terms of the evidence 
against them or their “apparent guilt” (Laudan, 2006), as 
shown in Figure 1b. The defendant will be found guilty if the 
jury finds that the evidence is above a criterion c, or standard 
of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt). Some innocent defen-
dants will incorrectly be found guilty if there is compelling 
evidence linking them to the crime, and some guilty defen-
dants will incorrectly be found not guilty if there is little evi-
dence that links them to the crime. Again, diagnostic 
accuracy—in this case the criminal justice system’s ability to 
discriminate between defendants who are guilty and defen-
dants who are innocent—is based on the overlap of the guilty 
defendant and innocent defendant distributions. Adjusting 
the decision criterion, or, in legal terms, adjusting the stan-
dard of proof, does not affect the ability to discriminate 
between guilt and innocence but again only affects the trade-
off of the two error types. Raising the standard of proof will 
not only reduce the number of false convictions but will also 
reduce the number of true convictions.
One of the key questions concerns the extent to which the 
criminal justice system can detect and recover from eyewit-
ness identification errors. Such error correction allows the 
guilty to be convicted even if an eyewitness fails to identify 
that person and allows the innocent to be released from sus-
picion even if an eyewitness falsely identifies that person. To 
the extent that the criminal justice system can correct its mis-
takes, there should be less overlap in the evidence distribu-
tions for guilty and innocent defendants (and less error) as 
the case proceeds through the criminal justice system than 
there is in the memory match distributions that underlie eye-
witness identification.
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures
It is almost cliché to aspire to the goal of increasing the accu-
racy of eyewitness identification. Who could disagree with 
such a goal? However, the controversy arises in how one 
defines accuracy, and policy decisions based on accuracy 
will depend on how accuracy is defined.
Much of the research, and the main thrust of the reform 
movement, has focused specifically on false identifications 
of the innocent. This focus is clearly seen in the published 
literature in which many papers illustrate the problem of eye-
witness error through case studies of false identifications that 
led to false convictions but rarely mention cases involving 
false non-identifications.
If the reduction, or even the complete elimination of false 
identifications, was the only goal, there would be little need 
for research. One could eliminate all false identifications by 
simply banning all eyewitness identification procedures. Of 
course, this would eliminate all correct identifications as 
well. Instead, the approach taken by eyewitness identifica-
tion researchers has been to develop procedures that reduce 
the false identification rate as much as possible while affect-
ing the correct identification rate as little as possible.
For decades, there was widespread agreement that this 
strategy had in fact succeeded and had led to a number of 
reforms that had been shown to reduce the false identifica-
tion rate with little or no loss of correct identifications (Wells 
et al., 2006; Wells et al., 1998). If this no-cost claim were 
true, then there would be little doubt that the proposed 
reforms increase overall accuracy. Policy decisions would be 
trivially easy because the recommended procedures would 
produce clear benefits (reduction of false identifications) 
with no costs (no loss of correct identifications).
However, the data from eyewitness memory experiments 
unambiguously refute this “no-cost” claim. With few excep-
tions, correct and false identification rates covary, as predicted 
by signal detection theory; procedures that reduce the false 
identification rate also reduce the correct identification rate, 
and procedures that increase the correct identification rate also 
increase the false identification rate (Clark, 2005, 2012; Clark, 
Moreland, & Gronlund, 2014; Palmer & Brewer, 2012).
When correct identifications of suspects who are guilty 
and false identifications of suspects who are innocent both 
decrease, it is no longer obvious whether accuracy has 
changed (and, if it has, whether it has increased or decreased). 
Clearly, a measure of eyewitness identification accuracy 
must consider both outcomes. The question is how these two 
responses should be considered together in an overall mea-
sure of accuracy.
On this point, there has been much recent disagreement. 
For decades, eyewitness researchers have measured accu-
racy as a diagnosticity ratio of correct and false identifica-
tion rates (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). The calculation and its 
interpretation are straightforward. For example, if the correct 
identification rate is .6 and the false identification rate is .1, 
the ratio is 6, meaning that a correct identification is 6 times 
more likely than a false identification (assuming equal num-
bers of guilty-suspect and innocent-suspect lineups). Despite 
its longevity as the accuracy measure of choice, researchers 
and legal scholars have long been aware of its statistical and 
interpretive limitations (Kaye, 1986). These problems have 
been most clearly articulated in the recent work of Wixted 
and Mickes (2012); Gronlund, Wixted, and Mickes (2014); 
and Clark (2012). The problem is that as the correct and false 
identification rates approach zero as responding becomes 
more conservative, the ratio approaches infinity. Thus, the 
ratio confuses and conflates diagnostic accuracy and crite-
rion placement. This can be seen in the fact that the ratio will 
increase with nothing more than an increase in the bias to 
make no identification. Adjusting the decision criterion does 
not affect the overlap of the underlying distributions and no 
change in true diagnostic accuracy—only an apparent one 
based on an ill-chosen measure.
The field’s longstanding—and in some cases continuing—
reliance on the diagnosticity ratio illustrates a fundamental 
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mixing of social science and social justice. Again, most peo-
ple—laypeople, researchers, and legal scholars—would agree 
that a false conviction of the innocent is a worse error than a 
false acquittal of the guilty. Consistent with that social and 
legal value, the diagnosticity ratio will tend to give preference 
to procedures that lower false identification rates—even if 
those procedures decrease accuracy. Thus, the preference for 
a particular identification procedure may appear to be based 
on overall accuracy, when in fact it is based on a response bias 
that conforms to a particular social value.
More recently, researchers have started to apply measures 
of accuracy based on signal detection theory, including the 
area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve 
and d′. Our discussion of these measures is at a conceptual 
rather than mathematical level to highlight the usefulness of 
the approach rather than the statistical details. Most impor-
tantly, and in contrast to the diagnosticity ratio, the area 
under the ROC curve and d′ both separate accuracy from the 
placement of the decision criterion.
ROC analysis provides a measure of accuracy across the 
full range of possible decision criteria. In that sense, it 
addresses questions such as the following: What if witnesses 
responded very conservatively (with a high criterion) such 
that they only made an identification when the match of the 
suspect to memory was very close? What if witnesses 
responded less conservatively (with a lower criterion), to 
make identifications of suspects who matched memory less 
closely? ROC analysis allows one to consider all of the pos-
sible decision criteria in between as well, producing a family 
of correct and false identification rates, rather than just one 
correct and one false identification rate per procedure. To the 
extent that the criminal justice system’s primary concern is 
the determination of the truth, policy makers should imple-
ment procedures that produce the highest ROC with the 
greatest area under the curve.
ROC analysis is the preferred method for measuring diag-
nostic accuracy, but it requires data that are not available in 
eyewitness identification research reports published before 
2012. The d′ statistic, on the contrary, can be calculated for 
any study that provides correct and false identification rates. 
It provides a measure of the extent to which the distributions 
for guilty and innocent suspects do not overlap and has been 
shown to be a good proxy for the area under the ROC curve 
(Mickes, Moreland, Clark, & Wixted, 2014). Thus, we dis-
cuss ROC analyses when they are available and summarize 
results in terms of d′ when ROC analyses are not available.
Application of Accuracy Standard to 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures
Police make a number of important decisions relevant to eye-
witness identification: Whether to conduct a one-person 
showup, or a lineup? If conducting a lineup, how should it be 
put together? What should the witness be told about the 
procedure? How should the procedure be conducted? We 
apply the accuracy standard in addressing these questions 
below.
Lineup or Showup
Showups have been criticized by legal scholars for more than 
100 years (Gross, 1911; see also Borchard, 1932), as “the 
most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever 
used by the police.” (Wall, 1965, p. 28). This view was so 
well accepted that it remained untested until Gonzalez, 
Ellsworth, and Pembroke published the first study in 1993. 
The results of a meta-analysis of showup–lineup compari-
sons (Clark, 2012) actually showed a no-cost pattern. False 
identification rates for lineups are lower than for showups, 
and the correct identification rates are about equal, resulting 
in greater guilty-innocent discriminability for lineups than 
for showups. Results of more recent studies are also gener-
ally consistent with that pattern (Gronlund et al., 2012; 
Mickes, 2015; Wetmore et al., 2015).
Neither the long history of legal criticism nor the more 
recent history of empirical evidence has led any state or local 
jurisdiction to ban showup identification procedures. Showup 
procedures continue to be used by law enforcement based on 
arguments of necessity, efficiency, and timeliness. For exam-
ple, the California Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook states 
that “a showup held shortly after the offense benefits every-
one: The witness has the culprit’s image fresh in mind, so an 
innocent suspect gets cut loose immediately . . .” (Calandra & 
Carey, 2005). However, the empirical results suggest that 
showups may not benefit everyone; false identification rates 
for innocent suspects are higher for showups than for lineups.
However, the key comparison based on the timeliness 
argument is between a showup conducted immediately ver-
sus a lineup conducted later. Three studies that allow this 
comparison show mixed results. Yarmey, Yarmey, and 
Yarmey (1996) showed higher accuracy for the immediate 
showup (d′ = 1.446) than for the delayed lineup (d′ = 0.624); 
Dekle, Beal, Elliott, and Huneycutt (1996) showed equiva-
lent performance comparing immediate showups (d′ = 1.190) 
and delayed lineups (d′ = 1.006); and Wetmore et al. (2015) 
had shown higher accuracy for delayed lineups, irrespective 
of whether the lineup was fair (d′ = 1.705) or biased 
(d′ = 1.263), compared with an immediate showup (d′ = 0.581).
There is more research to be done on the showup–lineup 
question. In addition to the timing issue, the experimental 
research needs to capture important differences between 
showups and lineups as they are conducted in actual criminal 
investigations. In many of the experimental comparisons, the 
lineups and showups are both conducted with photographs. 
In actual criminal investigations, the showup procedure is 
conducted live, which should provide more information than 
is available in a head-and-shoulders photograph (which 
should increase accuracy), but showups are also sometimes 
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conducted from a distance or in poor lighting (which should 
decrease accuracy).
Lineup Composition
A general principle for constructing a lineup is to select fill-
ers in such a way that the suspect does not stand out and is 
not readily identifiable by non-witnesses. (If non-witnesses 
can pick out the suspect, the lineup may be biased.) Two pro-
cedures have been considered for achieving this goal, both of 
which are based on the similarity of the fillers to the perpe-
trator. Because the identity of the perpetrator is unknown 
(or at least uncertain), the similarity of the fillers to the per-
petrator cannot be assessed directly but must be assessed 
indirectly either through their similarity to the suspect (who 
may or may not be the perpetrator) or through their match to 
the witness’s description of the perpetrator (which may vary 
in its accuracy). Researchers have expressed a strong prefer-
ence for selecting fillers based on their match to the witness’s 
description of the perpetrator, rather than their similarity to 
the suspect (Luus & Wells, 1991; Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 
1993). The data, however, do not support this preference. 
Although the first published study (Wells et al., 1993) 
showed an enormous d′ advantage for description-matched 
lineups, the entire corpus of studies shows a d′ advantage for 
suspect-matched lineups (Clark et al., 2014).
In actual criminal cases, lineups are typically presented 
with photographs rather than with live human beings. This 
preference for photo lineups over live lineups is due in part 
to practical and legal considerations. A suspect in a live 
lineup has a right to have an attorney present, whereas a sus-
pect in a photo lineup does not. As a practical matter, fillers 
for photo lineups can be selected from enormous databases 
that are searchable with sophisticated image processing soft-
ware, and photo lineups can be carried to a witness anywhere 
and anytime, whereas fillers for live lineups are constrained 
by the current jail population, and the procedure must be 
conducted at the jail.
These legal and practical considerations, of course, do not 
directly address the issue of accuracy. For many years, 
researchers have asserted that live lineups are no more accu-
rate than photo lineups (Cutler & Fisher, 1990), but a recent 
review by Clark, Moreland, and Rush (2015) suggested that 
diagnostic accuracy may be higher for live lineups than for 
photo lineups. This makes sense, as live lineups provide wit-
nesses with more information than photo lineups, which 
would increase diagnostic accuracy by moving the underly-
ing memory distributions apart.
Lineup Instructions
It is generally recommended that witnesses be instructed that 
the person who committed the crime “may or may not” be pres-
ent and that witnesses are not required to make an identification. 
In the research, these “unbiased” instructions are typically com-
pared with “biased” instructions that imply that the perpetrator 
is present and that the witness’s task is to pick him. The recom-
mended “unbiased” instructions reduce both correct and false 
identification rates, with no change in accuracy as measured by 
d′ (Clark, 2012). These results suggest that the biased and unbi-
ased instructions conditions lie on the same ROC curve, and that 
the difference between them is best described in terms of a cri-
terion change rather than a change in accuracy.
Lineup Presentation
Researchers have recommended two reforms to the standard 
lineup procedure: (a) that the lineup be presented sequen-
tially rather than simultaneously and (b) that the lineup be 
administered by a person who is uninformed or blind to 
important aspects of the investigation. In the reforms, these 
two procedures have often been packaged together as the 
blind-sequential lineup; however, we will describe them sep-
arately below.
Sequential Lineup
A sequential lineup requires the witness to respond “yes” 
(that is him) or “no” (that is not him) as each lineup member 
is presented, one at a time, precluding comparisons between 
lineup members. Studies published prior to 2012 showed 
equivalent levels of accuracy for simultaneous and sequen-
tial lineups, using d′ as the measure of accuracy (Clark, 2012; 
Palmer & Brewer, 2012). Studies utilizing ROC analysis, 
published after 2012, show either no difference or a sequen-
tial lineup disadvantage (see Gronlund, Mickes, Wixted, & 
Clark, 2015, for a review). Why would diagnostic accuracy 
be higher for simultaneous lineups than for sequential line-
ups? One explanation is that the opportunity to make com-
parisons among lineup members helps witnesses determine 
the most diagnostic features, that is, those features that best 
distinguish between the perpetrator and similar fillers. By 
focusing on those diagnostic features, the memory match for 
innocent people will decrease (because the diagnostic fea-
tures will mismatch memory) and the memory match for 
guilty people will increase (because the diagnostic features 
will match memory), thus separating the memory distribu-
tions for guilty and innocent suspects (Wixted & Mickes, 
2014).
Blind Lineup Administration
Blind lineup administration requires, at a minimum, that the 
lineup administrator not know which position the suspect 
is in the lineup, making it impossible to deliberately or inad-
vertently steer the witness toward the suspect. In some cases, 
the blind administrator may be completely uninvolved in 
the case and thus also unaware of any other evidence of the 
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suspect’s guilt. There are very few published studies that 
have examined accuracy in blind and non-blind lineups, and 
those studies have made the critical comparison (blind vs. 
non-blind) across a number of other variables, complicating 
the interpretation of the results. Here, we present the simple 
comparison in a standard identification procedure with unbi-
ased instructions. An important caveat is that by focusing on 
a subset of conditions, the sample sizes become very small.
The first published study comparing blind versus non-
blind lineup administration (Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & 
Cutler, 1999) considered simultaneous and sequential line-
ups for innocent-suspect lineups only. Because they did not 
include a guilty-suspect lineup condition, we cannot assess 
diagnostic accuracy via d′ or ROC analysis. Nonetheless, the 
results are important to consider, as they do not show a con-
sistent reduction in false identifications. For sequential line-
ups, blind administration did reduce the false identification 
rate relative to non-blind lineup administration, but for 
simultaneous lineups, blind administration produced a small 
increase in the false identification rate.
Greathouse and Kovera (2009) showed a similar pattern. 
For simultaneous lineups, blind administration produced a 
small increase in the false identification rate, a small decrease 
in the correct identification rate, and a small decrease in d′. 
For sequential lineups, blind administration produced 
decreases in both the correct and false identification rate and 
again a small decrease in d′. Again, we note that the sample 
sizes were quite small. The d′ differences consistently favor 
the non-blind procedure, although they are not statistically 
significant.
Clark, Brower, Rosenthal, Hicks, and Moreland (2013) 
approached this issue in another way. The lineup administra-
tors were trained to steer witnesses in subtle ways to identify 
the suspect in a lineup. One example of how lineup adminis-
trators would steer witnesses toward the suspect was that 
they would ask for clarification if the witness mentioned a 
lineup filler but accept any mention of the suspect without 
question. This steering condition was compared with a con-
dition in which lineup administrators could not influence 
witnesses’ decisions. Unsurprisingly, when lineup adminis-
trators steered witnesses to the suspect, suspect identification 
rates increased for both guilty and innocent suspects. What 
was surprising is that the correct and false identification rates 
increased in such a way as to increase the diagnostic accu-
racy of the eyewitness identification evidence. Witness 
manipulation did not simply increase suspect identification 
rates; it increased accuracy. An unpublished study by Alberts 
(2007) showed the same pattern of results: Witness steering 
improved eyewitness accuracy. The explanation for the 
increased accuracy is that it is easier to steer witnesses 
toward a correct answer (the guilty suspect) than it is to steer 
them toward an incorrect answer (the innocent suspect). 
Clark et al. showed that efforts to steer witnesses to the guilty 
suspect were more likely to be successful, whereas efforts to 
steer witnesses to the innocent suspect would often result in 
witnesses identifying a filler instead.
These results create an uneasy conflict between the goal 
of increased accuracy and perceptions of justice and fairness. 
The accuracy standard would suggest that police officers 
should conduct lineups with full knowledge of the position 
of the suspect so that they can better steer witnesses toward 
that suspect. This uncomfortable conclusion led Clark (2012) 
and Wells, Steblay, and Dysart (2012) to pose the same ques-
tion (in slightly different ways): If the goal is simply to 
increase accuracy, what is to keep police from simply telling 
the witness whom to identify (“identify #4 or else”)? Why 
not place a red arrow above the suspect in the lineup? One 
response to such questions is to appeal to procedural justice 
rather than accuracy. However, there may be an accuracy-
driven solution to the “or else” and “red arrow” lineup proce-
dures, discussed in the next section.
Accuracy in Criminal Justice Outcomes
Eyewitness identification responses are only relevant to the 
extent that they contribute to the outcome of legal proceed-
ings against the defendant. On this point, it is important to 
note that an eyewitness identification does not mean that the 
suspect will be arrested, does not mean that the suspect will 
be prosecuted, and does not mean that the suspect will be 
convicted. Gould, Carrano, Leo, and Hail-Jares (2013) com-
pared two sets of real-world cases—those that resulted in 
false convictions versus those that resulted in “near misses,” 
that is, cases in which the charges were eventually dropped, 
or in which juries acquitted the defendant. Many of the false 
convictions—but also many of the near misses—involved 
false eyewitness identification evidence. Importantly, false 
identifications did not inevitably lead to false convictions. 
The impact of eyewitness identification evidence will depend 
on how it is weighed and evaluated by the police, by prose-
cuting and defense attorneys who resolve the vast majority of 
criminal cases through plea agreements, by the judge who 
may be asked to make a ruling on whether the evidence is 
admissible at trial, and by the members of the jury who must 
render a verdict in those rare cases that go to trial.
In this section of our article, we consider how the accu-
racy of criminal justice outcomes can be increased through 
the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. We focus specifically 
on the confidence expressed by the witness, the utility of 
video recording identification procedures, and the education 
of the jury through jury instructions and expert testimony.
Confidence
One way in which accuracy may be increased downstream in 
the criminal justice system is by considering witnesses’ own 
assessments of their accuracy through their expressions of 
certainty or confidence. The underlying intuition is that a 
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confident witness is more likely to be correct than a less con-
fident witness.
At the outset, we note that, contrary to this intuition, 
researchers have for more than 30 years held the opposite 
view—that trial courts and juries should not consider a wit-
ness’s expressions of confidence when assessing the accuracy 
of that witness’s identification because the relationship 
between confidence and accuracy is too weak to be helpful 
(Deffenbacher, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1983; Wells & 
Quinlivan, 2009). More recent analyses show that this view is 
incorrect and that confidence is a very strong predictor of 
accuracy (Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Sporer, Penrod, 
Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & 
Roediger, in press). In both laboratory experiments and field 
studies of actual criminal cases, eyewitnesses who are more 
confident in their identifications are much more likely to be 
correct than witnesses who are less confident in their identifi-
cations. The recommendation to ignore witness confidence 
effectively deprives the criminal justice system of one of the 
most diagnostic cues to eyewitness accuracy. Trial courts and 
juries should consider the confidence of the witness when 
assessing the accuracy of the witness’s identification. With 
that, we explore two questions: How will assessments of con-
fidence affect the accuracy of adjudicative outcomes, and 
what are the limitations of confidence in assessing accuracy?
The downstream effects of confidence assessments will 
depend on who is making the assessment and for what pur-
pose. Specifically, trial judges are often required to make 
decisions about whether the identification evidence should 
be admitted at trial, whereas juries are asked to make deci-
sions about the defendant’s guilt. These are very different 
decisions, and an assessment of the witness’s confidence can 
usefully contribute to both, although in different ways.
The admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence 
follows a procedure outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Manson v. Brathwaite (1977). Under Manson, if the trial 
court determines that the identification procedure was not 
suggestive then the evidence will be admissible at trial. If the 
procedure is determined to have been suggestive, the trial 
court may determine that the evidence is nonetheless reliable 
based on an evaluation of five factors, one of which is the 
witness’s confidence. Such rulings are to be based on the 
reliability of the identification evidence independent of any 
other corroborative evidence (however, see Koch, 2003, for 
examples of cases in which courts have erred on this point). 
In other words, an identification is not reliable because the 
suspect was found to be in possession of the victim’s wallet, 
for example. Thus, for an admissibility decision the judge’s 
consideration of the witness’s confidence may be viewed as 
being based on the (hopefully) optimal criterion on the ROC 
curve based on the relative costs of false identification and 
false non-identification errors.
The jury, however, is asked to consider all the evidence 
in rendering a verdict. Consequently, the consideration 
of confidence should have a different effect. In a simple 
weighting-of-evidence model of juror decision making 
(Hastie, 1993), a juror would weigh each piece of evidence 
based on its relevance and reliability. In such a model, a juror 
should give less weight to a low-confidence identification 
than a high-confidence identification when making a deci-
sion about the suspect’s guilt in the same way that an eyewit-
ness should give less weight to a non-diagnostic feature 
when making a decision about whether the suspect is the per-
petrator. Importantly, by giving less weight to the less reli-
able low-confidence identification, the juror can give more 
weight to other more reliable evidence. This reduces the 
overlap in the distributions illustrated in Figure 1b and 
increases the diagnostic accuracy in discriminating between 
defendants who are guilty versus defendants who are inno-
cent. This analysis should also hold for plea negotiations—to 
the extent that such negotiations are conducted in the 
“shadow of the jury,” that is, they are based on an expecta-
tion of what the jury would do if the case went to trial 
(Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014). The accuracy of plea 
agreements should increase through the assessment of wit-
ness confidence by prosecuting and defense attorneys.
We note two important limitations in the use of confi-
dence to assess accuracy. First, the confidence–accuracy 
relationship is not as strong for negative responses (i.e., iden-
tifying no one) as it is for positive responses (i.e., identifying 
someone; Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer et al., 1995). The 
implication of the differing relationships for positive and 
negative responses is that lawyers, judges, and juries may be 
able to reliably distinguish between correct and false identi-
fications based on witness confidence but may be much less 
able to distinguish between correct and false non-identifica-
tions based on witness confidence. Thus, confidence may 
provide a useful means for reducing the adjudicative accu-
racy costs associated with false identifications of the inno-
cent but not for reducing the adjudicative accuracy costs 
associated with false non-identifications of the guilty.
Second, the strong relationship between confidence and 
accuracy holds for confidence judgments made at the time of 
the initial identification but may not hold for confidence 
judgments made long after the identification. There is a large 
body of research showing that memory—and judgments 
about memory—can be distorted by events that transpire 
after the remembered event (Loftus, 2005). For example, 
witnesses may become more confident about their identifica-
tions if they later receive feedback indicating that they were 
correct (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Thus, a witness who ini-
tially is not very confident about his or her identification may 
become very confident by the time of the trial. For this rea-
son, Wixted et al. (in press) have recommended that jurors 
consider the confidence of the witness at the initial identifi-
cation but not the confidence expressed at trial.
These more recent assessments of the strong confidence–
accuracy relationship suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court, 
in Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), was exactly right when it 
included witness certainty at the time of the identification as 
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a factor to be considered in evaluating an identification’s 
reliability and that state courts in Georgia (Brodes v. State, 
2005) and Utah (State v. Long, 1986) have erred by removing 
witnesses’ expressions of confidence as a factor to consider 
when assessing the reliability of eyewitness evidence. The 
most serious error in this regard is found in the recently 
revised New Jersey jury instructions that did not simply 
remove confidence as a factor to be considered but went fur-
ther to explicitly—and incorrectly—instruct jurors that “eye-
witness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of 
accuracy” (New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges, 2012).
Videotaping
The goal of increased accuracy in adjudicative outcomes 
requires an accurate record of the identification procedures. 
Disagreements between witnesses, police, and attorneys 
regarding the nature of the procedures or the statements 
made by witnesses can only add noise to the adjudicative 
process (increasing the overlap of the distributions shown in 
Figure 1b).
The National Academy of Sciences recently recom-
mended that video recording of eyewitness identification 
procedures become a standard practice (National Research 
Council, 2014). This recommendation was made years 
before by Kassin (1998) on the argument that the video 
recording of identifications would reduce both deliberate and 
inadvertent misrepresentations by police. Simon (2012) has 
likewise recommended more complete and transparent 
records of criminal investigations.
Will video recordings allow jurors to more accurately dis-
criminate correct from incorrect identifications? Two studies 
bear directly on this question. In both studies, one group of 
participants witnessed a staged crime and made identifica-
tions from a lineup and another group of participants, that is, 
mock jurors, judged the accuracy of those identifications. 
Reardon and Fisher (2011) found that mock jurors were bet-
ter able to discriminate between correct and incorrect identi-
fications when they were presented with a video recording of 
the identification along with the witness’s testimony than 
when they were presented with the witness’s testimony 
alone. In contrast, Beaudry et al. (2013) concluded that the 
opportunity to view a video recording of the identification 
did not improve mock juror’s ability to distinguish between 
correct and incorrect identifications. However, there are sev-
eral problems with this study that make the results difficult to 
interpret. The one condition free of interpretive problems—
using simultaneous lineups, with a blind administrator, and 
without on-camera feedback to the witness—provided a 
mixed pattern of results (albeit with a very small number of 
participants’ data that precluded meaningful statistical analy-
ses). Mock jurors were best able to distinguish between cor-
rect and incorrect identifications when they were shown the 
video of the identification only, second best when they were 
shown the witness’s testimony only, and worst when they 
were shown both the video recording of the identification 
and the testimony. These results suggest that the video 
recordings provided the most useful cues to witnesses’ iden-
tification accuracy. One tentative explanation for the poor 
performance of mock jurors who were presented with both 
the video recording and the witness testimony is that the two 
sources of information may have provided conflicting cues.
We return now to the problem of lineup administrator 
influence. There is no evidence that the lineup administrators 
in these studies engaged in any behaviors that might be 
viewed as suggestive or coercive. Presumably, none of the 
experimenters told the witnesses whom to identify, “or else,” 
and none used a red arrow to mark the position of the sus-
pect. What if such suggestive and coercive procedures had 
been used? Would observers have discounted or dismissed 
those identifications based on the video evidence? The 
broader question is about the extent to which a complete and 
accurate record of the identification procedure is an antidote 
to the problems associated with such procedures.
On this point, the problem with police officers steering wit-
nesses to identify the suspect may not be about the accuracy of 
the evidence (which may actually increase) but rather about 
how juries interpret the evidence in the context of other evi-
dence. For example, a victim’s property may be found in the 
trunk of the suspect’s car, prompting the police officer to give 
the witness an extra nudge to identify that suspect from a 
lineup. The jury may erroneously believe that these two pieces 
of evidence are independent when in fact they are not. To the 
contrary, the identification of the suspect came about in part 
because of the property found in the suspect’s car. One promise 
of video-recorded identification procedures is that they may 
help jurors consider the non-independence of the evidence.
Educating the Jury
Researchers have argued that laypeople—the people who 
make up the jury pool—lack sufficient understanding of eye-
witness identification to be able to distinguish between cor-
rect and false identifications and have recommended that 
juries be “educated” through jury instructions or through 
expert testimony. There are two important issues to raise 
here: First, jurors may not be as incompetent as assumed 
(Desmarais & Read, 2011). Among other things, jurors have 
been criticized for putting too much stock in witness confi-
dence as a cue to witness accuracy when in fact their under-
lying intuition about the confidence–accuracy relationship is 
largely correct. Jurors should consider witness confidence in 
assessing accuracy, although it should be the confidence 
expressed at the time of the identification, rather than the 
confidence expressed at trial.
Importantly, jury instructions and expert testimony must accu-
rately reflect the advances in the scientific literature. The New 
Jersey jury instructions are incorrect in declaring that blind lineup 
administration leads to more reliable identification evidence 
and that confidence is not a useful cue to identification 
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accuracy. In addition, it is inaccurate for experts to testify that 
unbiased instructions, sequential lineups, or blind lineup 
administration increase the accuracy of eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence; none of these claims has a solid empirical 
foundation. It is inaccurate for experts to testify that a wit-
ness’s initial statement of confidence is not a useful predictor 
of that witness’s accuracy; this claim is clearly contradicted 
by a solid empirical foundation. Adjudicative accuracy can-
not increase by misinforming jurors about the social science.
Recommendations
If the purpose of the criminal justice process is adjudicative 
accuracy and the determination of the truth, then based on the 
current research, police should continue to use simultaneous 
lineups and should consider ways to increase the information 
available in lineups beyond the static, head-and-shoulders 
photo lineups that are commonly used. Lineups should be cre-
ated with fillers that are similar in appearance to the suspect. 
As eyewitness evidence carries forward, the criminal justice 
system should carefully consider the useful information in 
witnesses’ initial statements of confidence. Police should 
obtain a clear statement of confidence from the witness at the 
time the identification is made and should be cautious about 
identifications that are made with low confidence. Courts 
should continue to consider initial expressions of confidence 
in deciding the admissibility of the evidence but should give 
little or no weight to expressions of confidence made by wit-
nesses at admissibility hearings. Likewise, pattern jury instruc-
tions should instruct juries that the witness’s initial statement 
of confidence, but not subsequent statements of confidence, 
provide useful information for evaluating the likely accuracy 
of a witness’s identification. States that have removed confi-
dence as a factor to be considered by the jury instructions 
should consider adding it. The New Jersey instructions that 
explicitly instruct jurors that confidence is an unreliable indi-
cator of accuracy should be corrected.
The accuracy standard provides no basis upon which to 
make a recommendation about the instructions provided to 
witnesses. Although it seems reasonable to tell witnesses that 
the perpetrator may not be in the lineup and that they are not 
required to make an identification, because in fact both of 
these statements are true, there is no clear evidence to sug-
gest that including this instruction will increase accuracy.
Other considerations require additional research. For 
example, it is explicitly assumed that a showup sooner will 
provide more accurate identification evidence than a lineup 
later. As reasonable as this assumption may seem (and at 
some point it must be true—if “later” means months or years 
later), there are very few studies that allow the relevant com-
parison, and the results are not consistent.
Policy
Some states have implemented specific police procedures 
through legislation. In New Jersey and North Carolina, for 
example, police officers are required to present lineups 
sequentially, but the most recent research suggests that 
sequential lineup presentation decreases the diagnostic accu-
racy of suspect identification evidence. Thus, the laws in 
these states mandate that police use a procedure that has been 
shown to reduce the accuracy of identification evidence. We 
should expect that best practice recommendations will 
change as the research literature develops and evolves. 
Legislation that mandates the use of particular procedures 
may force police to use procedures that were considered best 
practices 10 years ago rather than procedures that are consid-
ered to be best practices now.
The practice of mandating particular identification pro-
cedures as a matter of law should stop. It is perfectly rea-
sonable for legislation to mandate that current best practices 
should be used. However, it is neither productive nor for-
ward thinking to mandate as a matter of law what those best 
practices should be. Changing laws can be exceedingly 
slow and fraught with political maneuvering that has little 
to do with the merit of the proposed law. Eyewitness 
research is entering a new phase in which past conclusions 
are being challenged and new views are evolving. The 
criminal justice system must be nimble enough that it can 
incorporate best practices as our understanding of eyewit-
ness evidence and its role in the criminal justice system 
evolve and advance.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect 
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support 
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This 
research was supported by the Presley Center for Crime and Justice 
Studies at the University of California, Riverside and by National 
Science Foundation grant 1061183 to Steven E. Clark.
Note
1. Although our framework borrows from signal detection the-
ory, it need not be tied specifically to it, and similar theoretical 
frameworks may also be usefully applied. We note also that for 
simplicity, Figure 1 shows distributions that are normal with 
equal variances for guilty and innocent. These properties are 
not critical, however, and particularly for the application to 
memory, there is evidence suggesting that the variances are 
unequal (see Malmberg, 2008; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 
1992; Wixted, 2007).
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